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We show that, if a quantum coin flip is combined with another quantum protocol, quantum bit
escrow, as a subroutine to realize a cheat sensitive quantum bit commitment, a nontrivial cheat-
ing strategy frequently becomes possible. This cheating strategy, where a dishonest party takes
advantage of the classical and/or quantum information transmitted in the quantum coin flip, is so
powerful that the dishonest party recovers even maximal quantum entanglement from the quantum
state once the dishonest party collapsed, whenever the dishonest party loses the coin flip.
PACS numbers: 03.67.-a, 03.67.Dd, 03.67.Mn
Quantum key distribution, which enables uncondition-
ally secure secret communication, is a promising applica-
tion of quantum information processing. However, many
cryptographic primitives [1] are necessary as well as the
secret communication to realize a variety of applications
on communication network such as electric money and
voting. A coin flip and bit commitment (explained be-
low) are important such primitives, but unfortunately it
has been shown that an ideal (perfectly fair) quantum
coin flip and unconditionally secure quantum bit com-
mitment are impossible [2, 3, 4, 5, 6]. However if the se-
curity requirement is slightly weakened or changed, the
quantum realization is known to become possible. For
example, it has been shown that non-ideal (biased) quan-
tum coin flip [7, 8, 9] and quantum bit string commitment
[10, 11] are possible. Another important approach in this
direction is to realize quantum bit commitment in a cheat
sensitive way [7, 12].
Suppose that there are two distant mutually distrustful
parties Alice and Bob. The purpose of a bit commitment
(BC) is to realize the scenario that Alice commits her
mind to a bit (b = 0, 1) and at a later time she reveals
it, but in such a way that Bob cannot know b until Alice
reveals it and Alice cannot reveal 1−b. On the other hand,
a cheat sensitive bit commitment (CSBC) is a weak BC
such that if dishonest Bob knows b before Alice reveals
it then Alice can detect the cheat, and if dishonest Alice
reveals 1−b then Bob can detect the cheat, each with
nonzero probability.
With the introduction of the important new concept
of such cheat sensitive protocols, a recipe for realizing
a quantum CSBC (CSQBC) also has been suggested [7,
12]. The idea is as follows: a quantum protocol, such
that either Alice or Bob can detect the cheat, is possible.
In this protocol, called quantum bit escrow [7], either
Alice or Bob can execute the final stage of the protocol
to detect the cheat (where a quantum state is verified).
When a quantum coin flip is used as a subroutine for the
purpose of deciding which party is to execute the final
stage, then both Alice and Bob become able to detect
the cheat albeit with a smaller nonzero probability. It
seems to have been widely believed that this construction
method of CSQBC is promising and is indeed possible.
In this paper however we show that, if a quantum coin
flip is combined with a quantum bit escrow as a subrou-
tine to realize CSQBC, a nontrivial cheating strategy fre-
quently becomes possible. In this strategy dishonest Bob
takes advantage of the classical and/or quantum informa-
tion transmitted in the quantum coin flip, and he robs the
information of b without being detected by honest Alice
at all. This cheating strategy is so powerful that, when-
ever he loses the coin flip, dishonest Bob recovers even
maximal quantum entanglement from the state once he
collapsed.
Throughout this paper, the phrase “a party checks a
state” means that the party verifies whether the state is
expected one or not by an appropriate projective mea-
surement (getting the total part of the state in her/his
hand if necessary). If the state is not expected one,
the party detects the cheat of the opponent party with
nonzero probability. Moreover, a state used for the pur-
pose of a bit commitment and coin flip is called bc-state
and cf-state, respectively. Let |±〉 = (|0〉±|1〉)/√2 and
|φ±〉=(|00〉±|11〉)/√2.
Then let us first recall the example of the CSQBC pro-
tocol proposed in [12] (the notations have been changed).
Stage 0 (preparation): Bob prepares |φ+〉CD and sends
the C qubit to Alice. This state is used as a cf-state.
Stage 1 (commitment): To commit to b = 0 (b = 1),
Alice prepares either |0〉B or |−〉B (either |1〉B or |+〉B)
each with probability 1/2. The state is written as |ξbx〉
where x denotes the basis used in the encoding of b. Alice
then sends the B qubit to Bob. This state is a bc-state.
Stage 2 (opening): Alice optionally checks the cf-state.
Alice then reveals b. Next, Bob optionally checks the cf-
state if Alice did not use the option.
Stage 3 (verification): If either party earlier checked
the cf-state, the party automatically loses the coin flip.
Otherwise Bob measures theD qubit of the cf-state in the
{|0〉, |1〉} basis. Bob then sends the result to Alice and
she confirms the validity by measuring the C qubit. If
the result is 0 (1), Alice (Bob) loses the coin flip. Finally,
a winner of the coin flip checks the bc-state (Alice reveals
x when Bob checks the bc-state).
When Alice honestly obeys the protocol, there exists
2a nontrivial cheating strategy for Bob. We explicitly de-
scribe it in the following: Bob honestly prepares the cf-
state and sends the C qubit to Alice. Therefore if Alice
uses the option checking the cf-state, it is lucky for Bob
because Alice automatically loses the coin flip and Bob’s
cheat on the bc-state is not discovered. Hereafter, we
thus consider the case where Alice does not use the op-
tion. After the commitment stage, Bob deviates from the
protocol and performs a positive operator valued mea-
surement (POVM) on the B qubit to guess the value of
b. The POVM elements are
M0=
2
3 |ψ0〉〈ψ0|+ 13 |ψ1〉〈ψ1|,
M1=
1
3 |ψ0〉〈ψ0|+ 23 |ψ1〉〈ψ1|, (1)
where |ψ0〉 = cos pi8 |0〉 − sin pi8 |1〉 and |ψ1〉 = sin pi8 |0〉+
cos pi8 |1〉. When Alice committed to b=0, Bob obtains the




When Alice committed to b=1, Bob obtains the outcome
of 0 with p0|1= 12−
√
2
12 . The mutual information between
Alice and Bob is then 1−h(12+
√
2
12 )≈0.04 bits with h(x)
being a binary entropy function. The drawback of the
POVM is of cause to collapse the state. Indeed, when
Alice sent e.g. |0〉B and Bob obtained the outcome of 0,
the state is collapsed as











Alice then reveals b but this is unimportant for Bob.
Now Bob has three choices for his behavior: using the
option checking the cf-state, declaring 0 or 1 as a mea-
surement result on the D qubit. To select these choices,
Bob performs another POVM on the B and D qubits.
Suppose that Bob obtained the outcome of M0 in the
earlier POVM (when Bob obtained the outcome of M1
earlier, |ψ0〉 and |ψ1〉 must be read as exchanged in {Li}








When the outcome of the POVM {Li} is 0 or 1, Bob
declares it as the result of the measurement on the D
qubit (hence Bob does not use the option checking the
cf-state). Since Bob honestly sent |φ+〉CD earlier, the
result does not contradict Alice’s measurement on the C
qubit. When the result is 0, it is lucky for Bob because
Alice loses the coin flip. When the result is 1, Bob loses
the coin flip and the bc-state will be checked by Alice.
However it is found that the collapsed bc-state always
goes back to the original state and therefore Alice cannot






8 |ψ0〉+ sin pi8 |ψ1〉) ∝ |0〉B.
When the outcome of the POVM {Li} is 2, Bob de-
clares to use the option checking the cf-state and gets the
C qubit in his hand. Bob then performs a unitary trans-
formation (U) on the B, C and D qubits, which maps
|ψ0〉B⊗|11〉CD to |ψ0〉B⊗|00〉CD and maps |ψ1〉B⊗|00〉CD
to |ψ1〉B⊗|00〉CD. By this procedure, the collapsed bc-
state always goes back to the original state, and again
Alice cannot detect Bob’s cheat. Indeed,





8 |ψ011〉+ sin pi8 |ψ100〉)BCD
U−→|0〉B ⊗ |00〉CD. (3)
In this way, Bob can always rob 0.04 bits information
of b before the opening stage without being caught by
Alice. Note that any knowledge of the original state is
unnecessary for Bob to recover the original state.
To see the physical meaning, let us consider a prob-
lem of securely sharing and maintaining entanglement
between distrustful parties. Suppose that Alice is re-
quired to send a half of a maximally entangled state to
Bob. However Bob is doubtful whether she honestly sent
the entangled state or not. On the other hand, naughty
Bob tends to do mischief on the shared entanglement and
he sometimes destroys the entanglement. Alice worries
about it. At a later time, Alice wishes to confirm that
the entanglement is maintained safely, and Bob wishes
to confirm that Alice honestly sent the entangled state.
The situation is quite analogous to QBC if the shared
entanglement is regarded as a state committed by Alice
in QBC. Therefore one may expect that this problem is
resolved in a cheat sensitive way if a quantum coin flip is
introduced, for example by the following protocol.
Stage I (sharing): Alice prepares |φ+〉AB and sends
the B qubit to Bob. This entanglement is to be shared
and maintained, and hence let us call |φ+〉AB a bc-state
by the analogy to CSQBC.
Stage II (verification): Alice prepares |φ+〉CD and
sends the D qubit to Bob. This state is a cf-state. Next,
Bob optionally checks the cf-state. If Bob uses the op-
tion, he automatically loses a coin flip. Otherwise Bob
measures the D qubit in the {|0〉, |1〉} basis. Bob then
sends the result to Alice and she confirms the validity. If
the result is 0 (1), Alice (Bob) loses the coin flip, and a
winner of the coin flip checks the bc-state.
This protocol is secure against Alice’s cheat. Indeed,
when the state Alice prepared is written as |Ψ〉AaBD
where Aa denotes Alice’s large system including her an-
cilla qubits, it is found that the reduced state of the BD
qubits must be 141B⊗1D whenever the probability de-
tecting Alice’s cheat is zero, and hence Bob is ensured to
share 2 ebit with Alice.
Let us consider Bob’s cheat where Alice honestly sends
|φ+〉AB and |φ+〉CD. The general action of dishonest Bob
before the verification stage is described by a POVM.
Suppose that the entanglement of |φ+〉AB is (partially)
destroyed by the POVM and the post measured state is
|Φi〉ABa where Ba denotes Bob’s large system, i denotes
the outcome of the POVM, and pi is the probability ob-
taining the i-th outcome. After Bob received theD qubit,
Bob has three choices as in the case of the cheat men-
3tioned before. The general action of Bob at this stage
can be described by a POVM with three outcomes, which
may depend on the outcome (i) of the earlier POVM. Let
Liy (y=0− 2) being the POVM elements acting on BaD
qubits (and additional ancilla qubits if necessary).
Suppose that Bob obtained the outcome of y=2. Then
Bob declares to use the option checking the cf-state and
the bc-state will be checked by Alice. The probability











where P+ = |φ+〉〈φ+| and Λ is a trace-preserving oper-
ation acting on the BaCD qubits (note that Bob can
have the C qubit for y = 2). However, the singlet frac-




is upper bounded by F (σ) ≤
[trσ+N(σ)]/2. Here N(σ) = tr|σΓA |−trσ is negativity
[13] (ΓA denotes the partial transposition with respect
to the A qubit), and N(Λ(σ))≤N(σ) holds [14]. More-
over for σ being a pure state, N(σ) = 2
√
λ+λ− where
λ± are two eigenvalues of σA = trBaCDσ. In this way,





where m±i are eigenvalues of trBaDL
i
2(|Φi〉〈Φi| ⊗ 1D2 ).
Likewise, the probability P1 that Bob obtains the out-
come of y=1 and hence declares 1 as the measurement
result on the D qubit, Alice is convinced of the result,
and the bc-state passes Alice’s check, is upper bounded









1(|Φi〉〈Φi| ⊗ (|1〉〈1|)D2 ). Note that these upper
bounds of P1 and P2 are tight for the best cheating strat-




































































αβ≤ α+β2 − (α−β)
2
4 (0≤α, β≤1) was used.
Now, let us focus on the case where Pd=0 and hence
the probability detecting Bob’s cheat is zero. Since every
terms in Eq. (4) are non-negative, all terms must be zero
so that Pd=0. By expressing |Φi〉 in the Schmidt decom-
posed form as |Φi〉ABa = ai|ψi0〉A|ψi0〉Ba+bi|ψi1〉A|ψi1〉Ba







where |ψi0〉, |ψi1〉 are the states on the Ba qubits and
|0〉, |1〉 are on the D qubit. Since Li0+Li1+Li2 = 1 , it
is found that {Liy} satisfying Eq. (5) exists if and only
if a2i /b
2
i ≤ 2. Moreover it is found that a2i /b2i ≤ 2 is suf-
ficient for Pd = 0 because the second inequality in Eq.






i , and the
first inequality in Eq. (4) is tight for the best cheat-
ing strategy [an explicit construction is indeed Eq. (2)].






can recover the original maximal entanglement whenever
he loses the coin flip. Therefore, if Bob’s cheat satis-
fies a2i /b
2
i ≤ 2 for all i’s, Alice cannot discover the cheat







1=2, and the entanglement recovering
POVM of Eq. (2) is a solution of Eq. (5) for a2i /b
2
i = 2
[moreover it has been chosen such that the probabilities
obtaining L0 and L1 become equal to each other]. Note
that since maximal entanglement is recovered, an arbi-
trary state of the B qubit sent by Alice is also recovered.
In this entanglement recovering attack, it is a key point
that Bob can access the C qubit of the cf-state. Indeed,
when Bob obtained the outcome of y = 2, the original
entanglement is distributed among theABCD qubits [see
e.g. Eq. (3)]. Therefore, a possible way to make the
protocol secure against dishonest Bob is to prohibit him
from accessing the C qubit until he returns the B qubit.
This is achieved by modifying the verification stage as
Stage II ′ (verification): Alice prepares |φ+〉CD and
sends the D qubit to Bob. Bob optionally checks the
cf-state, but when Bob uses the option, Bob returns the
B qubit first and Alice sends the C qubit next, and then
Alice and Bob checks the bc-state and cf-state, respec-
tively. If Bob does not use the option, Bob measures the
D qubit and Alice confirms the validity. If the result is
0 (1), Alice (Bob) loses the coin flip, and a winner of the
coin flip checks the bc-state.
Indeed, this protocol becomes secure against dishon-
est Bob, which can be proved as follows. In this case
also, P2 discussed above (the probability that Bob ob-
tains y = 2 and passes Alice’s check) is upper bounded
by negativity. However, since Bob does not have the C
qubit, N(σ) is replaced by N(trCσ) = N(〈0C |σ|0C〉+
〈1C |σ|1C〉) ≤ N(〈0C |σ|0C〉) +N(〈1C |σ|1C〉), where the
convexity of negativity [13] was used. As a result, m±i
in Eq. (4) is replaced by m±ij which are eigenvalues of
trBaDL
i
2(|Φi〉〈Φi| ⊗ (|j〉〈j|)D2 ), and the last two equations








i must hold, and
hence Bob cannot destroy entanglement without being
caught by Alice. Moreover if Pd≤ε then |a2i−b2i |≤8
√
ε+2ε
is ensured, at least.
However, this modification introduces a serious prob-
lem to the protocol: the secureness against dishonest
Alice is lost. Indeed, if Alice sent |Ψ〉 = (|φ+〉|0〉+
|φ−〉|1〉)ABD⊗|0〉C/
√
2, she can always pass Bob’s check
by virtue of the B qubit she can get in advance of sending
the C qubit, though |Ψ〉 only contains 1 ebit (including
both bc-state and cf-state). We are then in a dilemma: if
Alice sends a state first Bob can cheat, but if Bob sends
a state first Alice can cheat. Originally a quantum coin
flip was introduced to resolve the dilemma in a quantum
bit escrow (or the problem of sharing and maintaining
entanglement): if Alice checks a state Alice can cheat,
but if Bob checks a state Bob can cheat. A quantum
coin flip seems to merely postpone the dilemma.
One may consider that the cause of the problem lies
in the fact that the coin flip used in the above protocol
is not a true coin flip. Indeed, the coin flip does not
output neither head nor tail when Bob uses the option
checking the cf-state. However this is not the cause of
the problem. Let us consider the true (biased) quantum
coin flip proposed in [9]. Using this, the verification stage
is modified as
Stage II ′′ (verification): Alice prepares |φ+〉C0D0 and
|φ+〉C1D1 and sends the D0D1 qubits to Bob. These are
cf-states, which are denoted by 0th and 1st cf-state, re-
spectively. Bob randomly picks z = 0 or 1 and sends it
to Alice. Next, Bob measures the Cz qubit of the z-th
cf-state, Alice confirms the validity, and Bob checks the
(1−z)-th cf-state. If the measurement result on the Cz
qubit is 0 (1), Alice (Bob) loses the coin flip, and a winner
of the coin flip checks the bc-state.
Even in this protocol using the true coin flip, Bob can
cheat as follows: Bob once partially destroys the entan-
glement of the bc-state by the cheating POVM Eq. (1).
At the verification stage, Bob performs the entanglement
recovering POVM Eq. (2) on the BD0 qubits. If the out-
come is 0 or 1, Bob declares z = 0 and maximal entan-
glement is recovered when he loses the coin flip. If the
outcome is 2, Bob declares z=1. By this he can get the
C0 qubit and again maximal entanglement is recovered
(regardless of the result of the true coin flip).
One may then consider that the quantum communi-
cation (transmission of the C or C0 qubit) from Alice
to Bob in the coin flip is dangerous providing the power
recovering entanglement for Bob. However this is not
the case. Let us consider the quantum biased coin flip
proposed in [7]. The verification stage is modified as
Stage II ′′′ (verification): Alice randomly picks (r, x)
and sends |ξrx〉D (see the stage 1 above) to Bob. Bob
randomly picks r′ and sends it to Alice. Next, Alice
sends (r, x) to Bob and he checks |ξrx〉D. If r⊕ r′=0 (1),
Alice (Bob) loses the coin flip, and a winner of the coin
flip checks the bc-state.
In this protocol, the classical communication of r arises
(instead of the transmission of the C qubit), which pro-
vides a room for attack. Bob’s general action to decide
r′ can be described by a POVM with two outcomes. Let







1/5|1〉 and |χ1〉 =
√
1/5|0〉+√
4/5|1〉. It is straightforward to confirm that this





1/6|ψ1ψ1〉 with the help of
r, whenever Bob loses the coin flip (r ⊕ r′=1).
In a quantum coin flip, classical and/or quantum com-
munication from Alice to Bob is inevitable to convince
Bob that Alice is honest. When the coin flip is combined
with a quantum bit escrow to achieve CSQBC, dishonest
Bob tries to take advantage of the classical and/or quan-
tum information, and this cheating strategy frequently
succeeds. The power of the strategy is so strong that,
whenever he loses the coin flip, dishonest Bob recovers
even maximal entanglement from the state once he col-
lapsed. A possible way to weaken the power is to delay
the communication in the coin flip, but this frequently
introduces a serious problem on the security against dis-
honest Alice, and as a result we are in a dilemma. In this
way, when a quantum coin flip is combined with another
quantum cryptographic protocol to resolve a dilemma in-
herent in the protocol, the coin flip seems to frequently
postpone the dilemma.
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